A Nice Hand?

Oddly enough, one of the reasons for me seeking out poker coaching is the fact that I’ve been doing so well lately.  Having winning sessions can mask problems with a player’s game.  Because a pot is shoved your way doesn’t necessarily mean you played the hand well.  In fact, this phenomenon can actually reinforce poor playing habits that will bleed a player’s bankroll dry in the long run.  An example of one of these hands is as follows:

Limped pot

Hero on the button with Q♥-7♥

Four players, 2 Big bets in the pot.

Flop:  J♥-5♠-6♥

Small blind bets

2 calls

Hero Raises

Small blind re-raises

The other two players fold

Hero makes it four bets

Small blind calls

Heads up, 7 Big Bets in the pot

Turn 7♣

Small blind checks

Hero bets

Small blind calls

Heads up, 9 Big Bets in the pot

River Q♦

Small blind checks

Hero bets

Small blind calls

Hero shows two pair, Small blind mucks his hand.

On first blush most players would look at this hand and say, “Great!  You won!  Nice hand!”  But was it?  With only one limper pre flop and me on the button, a much better play would have been to raise to try and get heads up with the limper.  An open limp is a very weak play and leaves one thinking “what could he have?”  Probably a very speculative hand that isn’t worth a raise and is very unlikely to connect with the flop.  I have a suited queen that has some slim showdown value, why allow the small blind 7:1 on a call and the big blind a free look at the flop?  If there were more than one limper in front of me, the overlimp makes sense, but not just a solitary player, raise away!

My flop raise was good.  I have a very strong hand against three players that is going to win about 36% of the time, far more than the expected average of 25% for the total of four players in the hand.  My goal is to get as much money as I can into the pot at this point, but SURPRISE, the Small blind ruins my plan by three betting and the other two opponents fold.  Now, my 36% is not looking so good.  Heads up with the Small blind, I need to be winning better than 50% of the time in order for any more bets go into the pot.  All bets going into the pot at this point are “going in bad” so here is my second mistake, the 4^th bet.

The turn gives me a pair but only 2^nd pair and completes a straight draw.  My opponent’s check is puzzling and could signal weakness but I’m still very unlikely to get him to fold and my hand is still not anywhere near the 50% equity I need to bet, but I bet anyway.  Mistake number three. A check behind and take my free card would have been a better play.  (incidentally, if I was out of position here, a bet probably would be the preferred play as sort of a blocking play, denying my opponent the option of checking or betting).

The saving Q on the river gives me the winning hand, so I hit a lucky card which does happen, especially in limit hold’em.  I do make the correct play of value betting the river and my opponent does call (out of position the better play might be to check here, concerned that only better hands will call and weaker hands would fold.  I also would be hoping my opponent might see the river as a scare card and try a bluff and I could call or check-raise).

I suppose the only consolation for this hand (besides winning the pot) is the fact that I have this hand analysis tool now that opens up a whole new way for me to understand why the decisions I make are incorrect.  I have my coaches and mentors to thank for this.  Hopefully soon it will result in better decisions at the table and long term profitability instead of lucky variance.

Reasons for Betting

One of the big lessons Ed Miller hammered home with me is to become very clear in my mind about my reason for betting.  Most players will say the reason they bet is because they believe they have the best hand.  I’ll discuss this reason more later but I’ve often found that players have lots of other reasons.

David Sklansky is famous for his theorem of poker that basically says he who makes the fewest mistakes of the smallest size, wins.  Many players interpret this idea to mean that their goal at the table is to get opponents to make the biggest mistakes possible.  So, if I can make intimidating bets to make my opponent muck their winning hand, I’m heading in the right direction.  Likewise, if I can make weak plays with the intent of getting opponents to call with weaker hands, again I’m getting the best of it.

In limit hold’em I’ve seen this play out over and over.  So many players get so frustrated when they are far out ahead on the flop but an opponent hangs on despite their ferocious betting and draws out on the river.  In the same vain, I’ve seen so many players moan in disgust as they turn over pocket A’s when they limped in preflop only for everyone to fold when they bet out on the flop.

Some players also bet to bluff.  In the games I play in bluffing doesn’t happen often but I’ve seen it.  Players with absolute air, betting like crazy to steal a pot playing little attention to what the board looks like.

Finally, I’ve seen many many players bet and raise because they want to “thin the field” or isolate on who they think is a weak player.  These players aren’t sure they have a winning hand yet but the know allowing other players to draw for one bet will “price them in” and they may draw out.

Ed told me that most of these reasons are simply wrong headed.  The plain truth is no one has any control at the poker table of anything that goes on.  Players play erratically and there is no possible way to get them to call or fold, price them out of a pot or any other course of action.  The best a player can do is clearheadedly watch your opponents tendencies, realistically evaluate the possibilities and make the best decisions you can given the information available.  Which brings me to the original reason to bet, for value.

Bets and raises should never be designed to try and influence opponents one way or another.  Rather, when deciding to bet, I need to think about when called, what percentage of my opponents range of possible hands he’s playing am I ahead of  AND how does that percentage of hands I’m beating stack up against my bet relative to the size of the pot.  An example: when the pot is large, 8 big bets, and I’m betting one to get 8, I only need to be ahead of a little more than 12% of my opponents range to make that bet profitable.  This is value betting and is the essence of fixed limit poker.

This analysis also applies to bluffing.  A bluff isn’t trickery, “seeing into your opponents’ soul” or some other method devised to manipulate.  It’s simply the analysis of what percentage of my opponent’s hands (given the flop texture and what I know about their playing) are they unwilling to showdown with AND how does that percentage stack up against the odds the pot is laying me for my bet.

Ed describes fixed limit as “one big percentage play.”  Basically, I’m betting when I think I’ve got enough of an edge given the size of the pot and I’m folding if I don’t.  Notice there is almost no room in this philosophy for checking and calling.  That’s because betting and raising is almost always right in limit hold’em.  The size of the bets are so small relative to the size of the pot, it’s mathematically correct to just stick the money in.  Ed says all players must use discretion and let the board texture and your reads on your opponents guide your decision making.  Also, solid fundamentals are critical to this strategy such has only playing premium hands. 

However, Ed advocates that in most situations I need to simply just be betting.  Another power element of this strategy is the benefit of disguising my hand strength and balancing my play.  It’s very easy for opponents to put me on a hand if I’m just betting and raising when I’ve got it and checking or calling when I don’t.  If I’m always betting and raising my play becomes much less transparent.  Opponents are left wondering what I have or how to react to me.  Furthermore, some opponents, some of the time, will fold. This “fold equity” can be added on top of that range percentage I’m using to guide my decision making.

Aggro Mode!

Well, it's good to be home from Las Vegas.  I had a very fun and profitable trip.  The first afternoon on my arrival I met with Ed Miller.  He was super cool and very patient with me.  I had documented about a dozen hands and we used these to help me think about my game and find out some flaws in my  approach and how to deal with

them. Ed is from New Orleans and got his degree from MIT.  He went to work for Microsoft as a software developer and started playing poker at some of the casinos and card rooms around Seattle.  Soon he began to make more money playing cards than working.  He moved to California and then to Las Vegas where he now lives.  Ed no longer plays for a living, rather his coaching and writing is his livelihood.  He is a coauthor of the book Small Stakes Hold'em which I have referenced many times in this blog.  He also recently published the book, How to Read Hands In No Limit Hold'em.

While examining my play, Ed suggested that I need to get comfortable with a more aggressive style.  If my goal is to eventually move up in stakes I need to pay more attention to habits in my play that make me transparent and vulnerable to exploitation.

One hand we discussed was when I was in the big blind with 4-7 of spades.  There was a late position raiser, two callers and I called.  The flop came 4-9-4, giving me trip 4's.  As usual I check, worried that if I bet out it would scare off my opponents and thinking it would just be too obvious if I bet out in early position, hoping to either check-raise the flop or to wait and pop the turn.

Ed told me that a more effective play would have simply to bet out.  He said that in general he advocates a very aggressive style of play where he is just always betting if he is in a hand.  A major reason for this is that it forces opponents to constantly guess at what he has.  If he deviates from this (like in my example) by checking, opponents are given the opportunity to wonder why.  They say to themselves, "This guy is aggressive, he's always betting and raising and now he suddenly checks, what gives?"

Ed suggested that not only do I need to bet out when I have a strong hand but even when I don't.  An example would be the habit I've developed of raising in position to try for a free card when I have a good draw.  Ed told me that playing draws aggressively is proper but if I check behind when I miss on the turn I might as well turn my hand over.  He said any decent player will quickly pick up on this play and whenever confronted with a similar situation he will check to me to see what I do.  If I check behind on the turn he will feel OK betting the river no matter what card comes, confident I will fold when I miss my draw.  Or, he won't pay me off when I bet because he will know I made my draw.

We also talked about my anxiety over playing big pots and the fact that I need to let go of my delusions of control at the poker table.  When the pot is big, I need to be OK with putting bets in even if I think it's unlikely that I'm ahead.  I need to focus not on specific hands my opponents might have but on the entire range they could be playing.  Let's say I have pocket 8's on a board of Ad-9d-7s.  My opponent could have an ace.  But, depending on how he played the hand, he could also have a flush or straight draw, two pair, or even a 7.  If the pot has 8 or more big bets in it I only need to be ahead of a very few of the hands in that range to play profitably when the pot is large.  Yes, I'm going to loose 7 or 8 times out of ten but when the pot is large the 2 or 3 times that I'm good, I'll win more than enough to make up the difference.

Most importantly, I need to let go of the idea that I'm in control of anything at the poker table.  The best I can do is objectively witness and evaluate what my opponents are doing and adjust my decision making accordingly.  When I bet and raise, it's not to thin the field or to force my opponents to make mistakes.  It's because I have a hand that will win more than it's share of the time and I need to press that edge, or because I've observed that my opponent may have a hand (like a busted flush draw) that he is not willing to showdown with.

Armed with a better way of thinking about the game I ventured forth to the Bellagio and a few other casinos and did quite well.  For the trip I ended up earning more than 2 big bets per hour!  I'm anxious to see how my learning will impact my performance at my local games.

Off to Vegas!

I haven’t posted much lately because I’ve been preparing for my first trip to Las Vegas.  I’m very pleased to have been able to set up a coaching session with Ed Miller, a poker coach and author that has probably influenced me the most.  In preparation, Ed has asked me to take notes on 2 or 3 hands on each of my sessions lately paying particular attention to decisions I’ve been making on the turn.  He says that even hands when my opponents all fold and I win the pot can mask problems with my game.

I’ve documented more than a dozen hands and I’m excited to get his feedback about my play.  I’m sure it will be good grist for the mill for future blog posts as well.  I also hope to have a few stories from the trenches to post.

I’m leaving a week from today!  Hopefully I have some posts ready by the end of the month.

Overcard Hangover

You know the scenario. A loose passive game and you wake up in middle position with A-Q of diamonds.  There is a limper in front of you and you raise.  The button, both blinds and the limper call; four players and you to the flop.  It comes J of diamonds, 5 of hearts and deuce of spades.  It checks to you, you missed the flop, and now you don’t know what to do.

This all too common situation is the reason why I’ve fallen into the habit of limping with these types of hands.  My thinking goes like this:  “Overcards are not made hands so why would I want to commit an additional small bet before I even see the flop.  When I miss the flop (I will at least a 2/3 of the time), I’ll be really glad I only committed one small bet and my hand will be easy to get away from with the pot small and only two cards to come.”  Another incentive I’ve come across is a small amount of deception it adds to my game.  On the occasion I do connect with the flop and make top pair, I’m often called down to the river by a dominated hand because my opponent doesn’t suspect my strong kicker since I didn’t raise pre-flop.

Ed Miller, David Sklansky and Mike Malmuth in their book, Small Stakes Hold 'em: Winning Big With Expert Play, challenge this thinking about playing overcards.  They point out that a hand as strong as A-Q suited is indeed a made hand and occasionally does win unimproved.  More importantly, poker is not a game to be played timidly if I want to win.  I must press my good hands for value.  A-Q suited is far better than such a large majority of starting hands.  It has a much bigger pot equity edge above any random hand.  Limping with such a strong hand fails to exploit the mistake my opponents make when they enter the pot with hands like A-x, Q-9 and the like.

My mind still wants to rationalize that the amount of money I make when I win pots post-flop will make up for the money I miss by not raising pre-flop.  In other words, I sacrifice pre-flop for post-flop expectation.  For some hands this makes sense like A-3 suited or K-J off suit.  Against loose-passive opponents the pre-flop equity edge is smaller so the sacrifice isn’t as large.  However, A-Q suited is FAR too strong a hand for this type of play.  The amount of money I win after the flop won’t overcome the amount I miss by not raising pre-flop.

If I’m honest with myself, I have to admit that the real reason I don’t pre-flop raise with my strong hands is that I’m afraid of a bad beat.  By raising I tie my opponents to the pot, giving them odds to call me down and suck out.  “Winning a small pot is better than loosing a big one” I rationalize.  But, a critical part of winning poker is evaluating expectation and making the correspondingly correct decisions.  There is no way to win long term without this ability.  I need stop allowing my insecurity to dictate my decisions and focus on the half full part of the glass.  Winning a big pot is better than winning a small one.  In fact, the difference in the size of these winnings (long term) will also be the difference in being a winning or loosing player.

Is the Glass One Quarter Full or Three Quarters Empty?

A hand I played in the other night went this way:  I was in the big blind with J-5 of diamonds.  A woman under the gun limped in, the cutoff and button limped, the small blind completed and I checked.  The flop came 10-8-4 all of diamonds.  The small blind checked and I decided to bet figuring it possible the A of diamonds was lurking out there and I had to make that player pay to draw (aka hand protection).  The UTG woman raised, the rest of the players called and I three bet.  Everyone called.  The turn was a blank, I bet, UTG woman called and the rest of the players folded.  I bet the river (also a blank) and the woman called and turned over two diamonds, K-3.

My opponent in this hand was the typical loose-passive player I see; playing far too many low expectation hands, staying in hands too long and not pressing good hands for value.  I certainly didn't expect that she had a flush and if she did that it wasn't as good as J high.  I felt like she probably had a set, two pair or less likely a 10 with a strong kicker or a naked A or K of diamonds.  A raise with a naked Ad would actually be a very good line to take (as well as an open ended straight draw) in this spot hoping to get to showdown for free, but I didn't feel she was capable of this type of play.  Only 18 combinations of hands could have beat me (A, Q and K combined with the other diamonds left in the deck).  This compared to the very large number of her much more likely holdings such as sets, two pairs, over pairs or weaker flushes that I'm absolutely crushing unless the board pairs or another diamond comes.

Flopped flushes are so incredibly rare (117:1).  When it happens you have to squeeze every ounce of equity out that you can because it's probably not going to happen again for a LONG time.  Two players flopping a flush is nearly twice as rare (205:1).  Given the hand combo analysis and the sheer odds in my favor, I believe my aggressive line was very appropriate.  So, what can I take away from this hand?

Winning fixed limit hold'em is about picking up extra bets by pressing your good hands for value but it's also about saving bets when you can.  Saving bets can be employed by making good plays (like the free show down raise mentioned above) and, of course, by not playing low expectation hands and not overplaying only moderately strong made hands (like top pair) and hopeless draws.  Not many players realize the importance of saving bets.  The example I laid out above was during a session that I ran fairly poorly in but while other players at the table had to rebuy over and over, I was able to hobble along with only my original $140 buyin.  By saving bets over and over I was enabling myself to play many more hands than my opponents for a much lower price.  This, in fact, was one of the first things I noticed when I started to learn to play better poker, that I was playing much longer sessions for the same amount of money.

I've talked about the importance of winning against weaker players but what's also important is LOOSING LESS against those same opponents.  The woman I lost the above hand to made a very critical error against me.  While I clearly had a spot to press for value, she had an EVEN GREATER opportunity and let it pass.  Calling the three bet on the flop was OK, maybe even the turn, but to not even raise on the river when I was so obviously pot committed?  That was downright sinful and it SAVED me at least $8 and maybe more.  Although it was painful to loose that pot, if I can focus on the 1/4 of the glass that's full and realize the money saved allowed me to live on and fight another day, it takes some of the sting out.

Fat and Thin Equity

I can't remember exactly but I think it was one of my poker gurus, Owen "qtip" Gaines, from whom I learned about the concept of fat and thin equity.  Finding thin equity is the edge that expert poker players have and what separates them from the pack.  Hands that normally would find their way into the muck when played by mere mortals somehow end up picking up small (and sometimes big) pots in the hands of an expert.  When my pocket 7's miss the flop I am almost always going to pitch them when the action gets around to me.  Yes, I'm going to grown and gnash my teeth when a 7 comes on the turn but with only about 8% equity (4% on the river) the pot would have to be absolutely gargantuan for me to call even one small bet.  Making this call is one of the HUGE mistakes bad players make and the reason why they are usually felted within half an hour and have to rebuy.

However, in the hands of an expert, 77 might represent the thin equity edge he/she could press to win a small pot here and there during a session.  Doing so a few times during a session could be the difference between winning and loosing for the night.  Being able to identify spots where you can press for thin equity takes some very advanced skills such as hand reading and identifying the style of play from opponents.  Expert players would consider things like how many players are in the hand, what they did pre-flop and what their tendencies have been thus far and the historic understanding of their playing style.  Taking the playing style and mood for the day of opponents, mixed with their action so far, figuring out the ranges of hands is next and how pocket 7's match up.  An expert might ask him/herself: "What percentage of these possible ranges am I ahead of?  If this identical situation was played out a thousand times, how often would I need to be good in order to make this call?  What is likely to happen on future rounds of betting?  What's my plan if my hand does or doesn't improve?  How might any given turn or river card affect my opponents hands."  And then, there is all the metagame elements:  "What's my history with this player?  Did I get caught bluffing recently against him/her?  How quickly or out of tempo did this player bet/call?  What hands am I representing here?  What are the better hands I think I could get to fold?  What does my opponent think I'm thinking what their hand is?"

Are you starting to get the picture?  Taking this myriad of factors and whipping them up into a coherent picture of what's going on in a hand is the level of play I aspire to some day.  Until that time most poker coaches recommend the patience and discipline of beginners waiting for hands with fat equity and pressing them for value.  This is especially true in the loose passive action of the fixed limit games I play in.  For the beginner the best strategy is to have a really clear picture of what hand you are hoping to make (for the record I'm counting primary draws among those hands but not backdoor or one-card draws) and have the discipline to muck your cards when that hand doesn't materialize.

Today, I woke up with pocket 9's in late position.  The flop came K-7-3 and it checked to me with one player behind on the button.  I was sure enough this player didn't have a K so I decided to try my thin equity edge and bet.  The button called and two other players called as expected.  The turn was a 2 with only two of a suit on board.  It checked to me again and I bet again, the button called and the other two folded.  I figured he had a 7, a weak K, a smallish pocket pair or turned a flush draw.  The river was a 6 putting three of a suit on board.  I checked fearing a flush and he turned over pocket 6's with a "sorry" and a sheepish grin.  I decided to press my thin equity in this situation and I got spanked for it.

Later in the session I had the same pocket 9's but this time the flop came 9-8-8.  Two players bet into me.  I smooth called the flop, popped the turn and won a big pot (in addition to a $200 high hand jackpot).  These two stories are good examples of how the same hand can represent both thin and fat equity.  Some day I'll get to the point of being able to exploit thin equity but until that time, I'm going to try and have the discipline to wait for fat equity situations and press them for value.