Where does Money Come From in Poker

Ed Miller is coming out with a new book and video series on mastering basic skills in poker.  This week he came out with the first video that serves and an introduction and lays out some basic premises about the game that I think are great.

The question Ed likes to ask all his new students is where they think money comes from in poker.  Invariably he gets three answers:  1.) Playing tight, 2.) Making Hands and 3.) Game Selection.

All players at low stakes play too many hands.  If you are supposed to play 15% of the hands you are dealt but play 30%, that extra 15% are all bad hands, by definition.  They aren’t sprinkled around in the range distribution (some good, some bad); they are ALL glopped on to the bottom.  It’s dead weight that bleeds money out of your bankroll and into stacks of your opponents.  So, playing tight (or put another way, the ability to fold) is a critical basic ingredient to winning poker but it is not sufficient.  No one has ever won a pot in poker by folding.  Playing tight will never put money into your stack at the poker table.    Likewise, as important as game selection is, the actual act of sitting down at a table play doesn’t put chips your stack; you need something else.

For nearly all my opponents, that “something else” is answer number 2, making hands.  Nearly all my opponents play too many hands with the strategy of seeing as many flops as they can, as cheaply as they can.  They play very passively preflop hoping to hit a monster and then find some poor chump to stack.  That’s why SO MANY of my opponents show up with suited rags and off suit connectors.  Their goal is to hit straights and flushes and get paid off by top pair.

So, what’s wrong with this strategy?  Many, many players I’ve run across have this sense of integrity or justice about the game.  They really feel like the goal in poker should be “the best hand wins.”  Any other outcome, in their mind, is evidence of bad play (i.e. over-reliance on luck) or simple thievery.  They bet and raise with strong hands and they check and call with medium strength hands or draws.  Winning, in their mind, is simply a matter of function of the game.  They run well and they win.  They run poorly and they lose.  The problem is that if everyone is playing the game like this (and for the most part, they are), no one except the house is winning any money.  It’s just an exercise in trading money back and forth.  I spike a set on the flop and get paid off by two-pair.  The next time, you spike the set and I pay you off.  True winning players are not trying to make hands.  They understand that making straights and flushes are simply a matter of variance.  They also understand that most of the regular players they face are good enough to recognize board texture and avoid paying off big hands.  And, herein lays the kernel of where money really comes from in poker.

Winning players recognize that making money in poker comes down to applying an appropriate counterstrategy to what their opponents are trying to accomplish.  Good players are essentially catching opponents in the act and making them pay a price for it.  If I am a winning player, I recognize that opponents are playing too many hands.  It then follows that on each street of betting my opponents have to figure out what to do with all these extra bad hands they are playing.  They can call, fold or bluff with them.  In the example above, the trend these days for regular players is to read the board texture and avoid paying off big hands.  The over-tendency to fold weak hands (and they most often are weak because they are playing too many hands to begin with) makes them vulnerable to bluffs.  As opponent’s frequency of folding increases, so my frequency of bluffing increases.  20% of the time I may run up against the top part of their range and I tap the table and muck my hand.  But, 80% of the time I am catching my opponents making consistent, systematic errors against me by folding too much and I win the pot.  Picking up these pots, pots that I don’t “deserve” to win, add up during a session and make the difference between winning players and the rest. 

Winning poker isn’t about making the best hand as much as it is recognizing opponent’s strategy and employing an effective counter strategy. 

Weak Leads

A weak lead (AKA donk bet, probing bet, etc) is a very common strategy I see quite frequently with my opponents.  Often I’ll see it after a preflop raise when the flop comes out small and dry.  There are a lot of reasons people do this but I think it mainly comes down to the fact that folks don’t like to check-call.  In other words, players will flop a middling hand they think isn’t strong enough to check-raise but they don’t want to get bet off their hand.  They also don’t feel like  their hand is strong enough to call a half pot sized bet or bigger, she they split the difference and bet out a small amount, hoping the preflop raiser will just call (or maybe fold) and they can see a cheap turn.

The problem with this strategy is that a.) it’s very transparent and b.) it leaves you out of position with no clear path forward for the rest of the hand.  Here’s an example:

3-20 live spread limit, stacks all about $100
Hero on the button with Kd-Qh
Three limpers, hero raises to $12
Blinds fold, everyone else calls
Four players, Pot $52
Flop 10d-9d-3h
Two limpers check villain bets $10
Hero raises to $20
Limpers fold, villain calls
Heads up, Pot $92
Turn 5s
Villain checks
Hero bets $20
Villain hesitates, shows 10h and folds

Ed Miller talks about regular players in low to mid stakes games almost universally play too many hands.  Their general strategy is see lots of flops as cheaply as possible, hit big and find some poor sucker to stack.  What ends up happening the VAST majority of the time is that they flop middling or weak and they end up calling down light or folding way too frequently.  Weak leads are a direct symptom of this poor strategy.  Villain probably limped in with 10-rag suited and lead out weakly trying to feel his way through this hand.  His hand couldn’t stand a big turn bet.  From my perspective the weak lead could only mean a hand not strong enough to check-raise and inviting me to bluff (small pair or top pair weak kicker).  I also wasn’t cold bluffing with my gut shot, overcards and backdoor draw.  With 10 outs I’m darn close to a coin flip on the flop against a pair (and even better with some fold equity mixed in).  Trying to understand the meaning of opponents play and how it relates to their overall strategy has helped my play immensely. 

What's Going On!

A situation arose the other night that had me change up decision-making a bit that illustrates an important point.  Trying to understand what my opponents are up to and constructing a counter strategy is the path to advanced poker.  In the spread limit games I’ve been playing in lately, in general, my opponent’s strategy has been to play as many hands as possible, as cheaply as possible and try to flop a monster hand and stack somebody.  This causes them to fold too frequently on later streets because they don’t make strong hands the overwhelming majority of times.  So, my counter strategy has been to build pots on the early streets that I can steal on later streets with big bluffs.  But, occasionally an exception comes along.  When I identify a tendency of a specific player (versus a general strategy of nearly all my opponents) I can make changes to exploit it. 

As I mentioned my general strategy is to build pots early in hands.  Betting middling and flat calls are usually the task preflop and on the flop.  I’m not into pre-flop shoving or massive overbets because I’m usually wanting two or three way pots.  I save my pot sized and overbets for the turn and river where my opponents make their biggest mistakes.  However, the other night I identified a guy, an older fellow with about $70 behind (2-20 spread game) at about three hours into the game made a big $10 preflop open saying, “I’m trying to go home.”  Often I’ve seen players make little speeches like this as a trap, trying to get calls when they are dealt a big hand.  But, this fellow followed up the next few hands with similar big open raises.  I obliged this fellow by 3-betting with pretty much junk hands and taking down the pot right there or with a big continuation bet on the flop.  I ended up taking the remainder of this guy’s stack when I did flop middle pair and put him all in on the turn.  He called with only A high.

Having a general strategy with opponents is important for sustained success but being able to recognize specific situations with individual  players and being flexible with my overall strategy is the way to true profit!

Range and Swing Hands

You know the scenario.  Strong hand preflop and you raise and suddenly you find yourself in a war.  Then, to top it off, the flop comes super scary and didn’t hit you at all.  So many times this has happened to me and my first inclination is the nearest exit.  The important thing about reading flop texture is determining where my hand falls in relative strength, no doubt.  But, an equally important and often missed aspect is determining the range of hands my opponents could have.  NOT the specific hands, but their range.  Ed has taught me start thinking in terms of targeting the hands that opponents could have and less about what hands are beating me.  Here’s an example:

Live 2-20 spread limit.  Stacks are deep, over $100
Hero in Low Jack with Qs-Qh
UTG +1 raises to $8
Hero 3-bets to $28
High jack caps at $48
Big blinds calls
UTG +1 calls
Hero calls
Four players, $195
Flop Ks-Kh-7h
Checks to HJ who bets $20
UTG +1 calls, Hero raises to $40
Both villains call
Three players, $312
Turn 5c
Checks to hero who bets $20
Both villains call
Three players, $372
River 6d
Checks to hero who bets $20
HJ thinks, calls, UTG +1 folds
Hero shows QQ, villain mucks

So, nightmare flop, right?  In the past my first thought would be to find the next opportunity to fold but Ed has taught me to stop and think for a second.  This flop is very polarizing.  My opponents either have me crushed or are very far behind.  Obviously, pocket K’s are beating me to the pot, so I can’t worry about that hand (and how incredibly unlikely flopped quads are).  With preflop action it’s very unlikely either opponent has K-Q (especially since I have 2 queens) down to K-10.  That leaves only one hand, A-K, to really worry about.  So, what other hands could my opponents be playing and where does my hand fit in with them?  The big question is, as always, can I get better hands to fold or worse hands to call?

AA is a distinct possibility of a hand I’m up against given the action, as well as QQ.  These are hands that I am targeting with my flop check-raise.  It is unlikely opponents would fold these hands but if they did it would be because they thought I had a K which is reasonable to represent with this betting line.  This pot is big and it’s worth going after.  The small chance that my opponents would fold these pocket pairs is worth the risk of this line (check-raise, bet, bet $80 to win more than $200).  New information I would look for to change my thinking would be a raise on the turn, which didn’t happen.  When betting to get better hands to fold, Ed taught me the best way is with at least some equity.  If by chance I can’t get a fold from AA (or even a king), I have two queens and running hearts to luck out with.

There is also the distinct possibility of opponents calling with worse hands.  JJ, A-Q, Ah-Jh, even 10-10 or 9-9.  Heart and straight draws are also possible. In targeting these hands my betting line is for value.

The answer to the all-important question is both.  My betting line to get weaker hands to call AND to get better hands to fold along with at least some possibility of drawing out.  Thinking in terms of a range of hands and especially the target or “swing” hands that my opponents could have is how to proceed.  On polarized flops like this if my opponent has the nightmare hand nothing I do can will make any difference in what happens (i.e. losing) and I’ll find out soon enough.  Focus on what hands my opponents might have and it makes a difference what I do.

Evaluating Opponents

Ed Miller has taught me that players I’m going to face in low stakes game essentially fall into the loose-passive category.  The big mistake these opponents make is that they play too many hands, are too willing to put money in the pot pre-flop and on the flop and use a “fit or fold” strategy post-flop.  By the turn, almost all the time, they are faced with two options with weak hands (bottom pair, gut shot), calling down or folding.  In fixed limit, the option is most often calling down.  In no-limit the option is mostly folding.  What this means for my strategy is that I need to bluff less often in fixed limit but bet my marginal hands for value.  In no limit I need to build pots early in a hand to set up a big turn bet to steal.

This is a good basic strategy but occasionally I run across players who don’t behave in ways I expect.  A fellow I faced in a 4/8 FL game recently was doing the usual loose-passive thing.  He won a good sized pot and open raised the next hand, bet flop and turn and won another pot.  This game had a “kill” on.  When players win back to back hands, the stakes double for the next hand.  This player open raised on his kill but this time another player played back, three betting.  A raising war broke out for the rest of the hand and this follow turned 4-6 off suit at showdown for bottom pair and lost an enormous pot.  He then returned to his usual limping preflop and “fit or fold” post flop.  This pattern repeated a few times and I realized something.  This guy was superstitious and after winning a big pot was talking himself into thinking a heater was starting.  He started talking about this (I think embarrassed and trying to justify himself to the table) in terms of “I have to play my run.”  I’ve done this myself, feeling frisky on occasion, doing things like raising and betting down blind when I get a kill.  It’s fun and can be profitable if there are weak-tight players at the table.  But, this fellow in my story here was doing this as a habit.  He was doing it every time he won a pot or two.  That’s a significant tell and led to a hand I played with him:

Hero in cutoff with 4c-7c
Three limpers, hero limps
Villain (on button) raises
Big blind calls, first limper 3-bets
One limper calls, hero calls
Villain caps, bb calls, Limper calls, hero calls
Four players, 10 big bets
Flop Kc-5d-8s
Checks to hero who checks
Villain bets, limpers call
Hero raises
Villian 3-bets
BB and limper fold
Hero calls
Heads up, 15 big bets
Turn 6d

Hero bets
Villain raises
Hero 3-bets
Villain calls
Heads up, 21 big bets
River Ah
Hero bets, villain calls
Hero show straight, villain mucks, says he had A-K

My turn 3-bet is an example of exploiting villain’s tendency to over play what he believed was a streak.  Against “normal” players I have to consider that my straight isn’t the nuts (9-7 beats me) and just calling the raise might be the way to go.  But, because villain’s range is so wide (literally any two cards) my small straight is miles ahead and I feel great raising away.

Having a solid basic strategy to beat most run-of-the-mill players is important but to really profit, watching what’s going on at my table and trying to come up with a theory of what players are trying to do is the way to go.  Player’s behavior isn’t random.  There is purpose in what they are doing.  The more I can understand what my opponents are trying to accomplish, the better I will be at putting a counter strategy together and profit.

Transitioning to No Limit

1-2 NL Live.  Stacks around $150

Hero 3 off the button (low jack) with 7d-8d
Two limpers, hero limps
Highjack limps
Button raises to $10
One limper calls
Hero calls
Highjack calls
Four players, $43
Flop Jc-5d-3c
Limper checks, hero checks
Button bets $30
Everyone folds

Same hand

Hero raises to $10
Button calls, Limper calls
Three players, $33
Flop Jc-5d-3c
Checks to hero who bets $15
Button calls, limper folds
Heads up, $66
Turn Qh
Hero bets $60
Villain folds

The second hand is an example of situations I faced on my last trip to Las Vegas over and over.  I’ve been transitioning to no limit and spread limits games and I had a very fruitful meeting with my coach, Ed Miller.  Ed emphasized to me that most consistent and disastrous mistake players will make against you is that they play too many hands.  When players have junk hands they rarely hit big and can play aggressively.  A much more likely case is hitting the flop lightly and having two options: 1.) Call down or 2.) Fold.

During the Moneymaker era when fish schooled into casinos to play poker, calling down was the option of choice.  Chips rained from heaven in those days and it was easy to make truckloads of money by waiting around for big hands and getting paid off.  The more common option these days is to fold.  Regular players have learned that making big calls with marginal holdings is generally not the way to make money in poker.  They would never make a pot sized bet on the river without having very close to the nuts and assume others would play this way as well.  The problem nearly all regular players have is that because they play too many hands they are caught too often with marginal hands.  Hands like unsuited connectors, suited rags and ace-rag typically flop middle or bottom pair, or top pair with a weak kicker.  These hands almost always don’t improve and when faced with a big bet on the turn players fold.

The trick is to realize the fundamental error that low stakes players make (playing too many hands) and the two options they have with these weak holdings (calling or folding).  When you are lucky enough to find a game where opponents are calling down with weak hands the game becomes as simple as the halcyon days of Moneymaker:  sit back, make hands and press for value. 

Much more common is to find tables full of regular players who have become very good at not paying off big value hands.  The flop in the hand above is a perfect example.  Regular players recognize that single high card and very dry boards polarize an opponent’s range.  Either the leading bettor is very strong or bluffing.  When a big bet comes on the later streets these players figure they have gotten their answer and fold their weak middle pair, gut shot or overcards.

Exploiting this tendency of players folding too much is tantamount to out-and-out thievery.  Ed talks about the fact that advanced players make most of their money by out playing opponents on the later streets.  Most players play pre-flop and on the flop well so my goal is to build pots on these first two streets to steal on the later streets.  The question I am asking myself when dealt a hand I’m going to play is “How can I set up this hand so that a big turn bet, designed to steal this pot, is nearly automatic?”  The two biggest factors in this question are hand selection that yields good equity and solid board texture reading.

In the above hands 7-8 suited is excellent not because it flops monsters but because it yields such good equity by the river.   The flop completely missed this hand but so many cards can come on the turn (any diamond, 10 , 6, 7 or 8) that improve my hand.  My flop bet isn’t just a naked bluff that I’m plowing in.  I have equity.  So many times my opponents will have weak hands but in the few cases when the do flop a set or two pair, I have a ton of ways to get there by the river.  That can never happen if I play hands like A-rag.

Ed has said it a million times, the bread and butter of advanced players is solid board texture reading.  Had the flop been Q-K-10 there would have been no reason to continue betting at this pot because I have no equity and my opponents aren’t going anywhere.  Another reliable aspect of regular players is that they don’t bluff enough.  If I check the flop and they come out with a bet on the turn I can be confident they have a hand enough of the time to make my fold a good decision.

When considering board texture, the key card is the turn.  Most flops come down loosely connected with a single or two high cards.  Opponents will most often have gut shots, three or four card flush draws, middle or bottom pair or top pair with a weak kicker.  The Qh in the above example is a good brick card because it doesn’t complete any draws and it’s a good scare card to what I am representing.  Even if the card does hit my opponent who has maybe Qc-6h it would be very hard for him to continue when faced with big bets on the turn and river.  My 7-8 with this board is good enough that even bad cards like a 4 or 6 that improve my opponents hands, also improve mine.  Pretty much only the board pairing is what I would need to worry about (making trips and full houses), cards that improve my opponents but not me and may lead to me drawing dead or very slim.

Essentially what Ed is asking me to do is turn my game upside down.  What I’ve been doing up till now is waiting for hands with big pot equity, raising preflop and praying to hit the board.  Usually, on missing the flop I would c-bet, praying to improve on the turn but rarely putting a big bet out unless I did.  Now, I am happy to see a brick on the turn and am less concerned about the two cards I am playing.  I only know that card didn’t improve my opponent’s hand and they will consistently fold to a big bet.  Occasionally an opponent will turn up with a slow played set or two pair and put in a big raise.  Because they don’t bluff enough, I can be confident in my fold.  Even if they show the bluff it still doesn’t change my answer because they are still folding the turn 70-80% of the time.  My turn bets are a profit lock in this scenario.

Suck out!

Hero in SB with Q-J off suit
Four limpers, hero completes, BB checks
Six players, 3 big bets
Flop 10-K-A rainbow
Hero bets, three callers
Four players, 5 big bets
Turn 9
Hero bets, UTG calls, UTG +2 raises
Folds to hero who three bets
UTG fold, UTG +2 calls
Heads up, 11 big bets
River 10
Hero bets, UTG +2 apologizes, calls and show A-10 for full house
Hero mucks

It’s been said that if you don’t get sucked out on regularly you aren’t playing correctly.  It’s incredibly frustrating to be the “victim” in the hand above but it does happen to me with some regularity.  It would be nice to understand why suck outs happen to tight-aggressive players more often as some consolation.

My turn 3-bet in the above hand is a good example of pressing a hand for value.  The 9 on the turn changed nothing in my opponent’s range.  The worst I can do is chop at this point.  Better players understand hand strength and get extra bets in.  The majority of my opponents don’t and I’ve seen them just call in spots like this, over and over.  Getting an extra bet in also bloats the pot.

The two aspects of value in any hand are folding equity and showdown value.  In order to maximize showdown value you need two things as well.  You need to get money in the pot (by bloating it) and you have to get to showdown.  Typically, in small stakes fixed limit, getting money in the pot often also overlaps with getting to showdown because the pot is offering such good odds.  What this means is if I am playing correctly, aggressively pressing hands for value, I’m also making it more likely that strong (draws and second best) hands will call down.  Opponents calling down with draws and strong (but 2^nd best) hands are good news for me but also means they will draw out from time to time.  The alternative is not very palatable.

Without a showdown the only value a hand has is its fold equity, basically just two face down cards.  In the above hand, had I bet and everyone folded (or one caller who folds on the turn) I may as well have been betting two napkins for the 3 measly big bets I earned.

It’s good news to have my big hands paid off but that satisfaction comes with a price.  I have to allow for the inevitability of my opponents sucking out on me.  Otherwise, I turn every hand into 7-2.