Whoa! Back it up!

One of the concepts I’ve been working on with reading board texture is reverse implied odds.  Implied odds, you may know, are the extra bets you can add to pot odds when considering continuing in a hand with a draw.  Gut shot straight draws are a good example.  If there are three of four players in a hand and I have a got shot draw, the pot as it is on the flop is probably not big enough to justify me drawing to only four outs.  But, having to pay only one small bet (another benefit to playing in position) with the expectation of getting two or three more big bets on the next two streets and adding those to the pot will push my odds over the threshold.

Reverse implied odds come into play when considering what my opponents may be drawing to and the equity they have in the hand with their draw.  The concept is especially important when “dirty” outs come into play.  A good portion of the time, cards that come on the turn and rive may make my hand but may make my opponents stronger hand.  Here’s an example.

Hero in cutoff with Ad-Js
Three limpers, hero raises
Big Blind calls, all limpers callFive players, 5 big bets
Flop 9s-10d-Qd

This flop hits all kinds of hands but what’s most concerning is thatmy outs are likely dirty.  Straight and flush draws all have significant equity against me and even if my A is currently ahead I have very little equity because these draws hit so often.  I have terrible reverse implied odds. 6 and 7 are bad cards and probably the worst card would also make my hand, the J.  Even if I hit my A I’m still not super in love with my hand as KJ is crushing me and I’m also vulnerable to my opponent’s two pair hands.  So, while I do have an open ended draw, It’s probably not worth continuing to bet at this pot as my opponents aren’t going anywhere and half my straight outs are likely dirty as well.

Highly coordinated flops that don’t hit you are not worth barreling on and reverse implied odds are the reason.  

Tail of Two Variances

Learning to identify variance is a super important part of being a good card player.  It’s a skill that has to be developed and is one of the more tricky one’s to master for me.  When variance strikes I typically have two reactions.  I grumble at a player who I think is making poor poker choices and getting rewarded for it.  Or, I curse my fate and wonder if I’m misplaying or if I’m just not cut out to be a threat at the card table.

Variance will happen to anyone who plays cards and player’s beliefs about it (and the corresponding emotion) can have a significant impact on their play and bottom line.  One way to help mitigate the impact of variance on my game is to think about it in more objective terms.  The better I can describe variance, the better I’ll be able to recognize it and defuse its impact on my decision-making.

In light of becoming better at describing variance, here are a couple of hands:

1.)    Hero on the button with Ad-10c
Folds around to hero who raises
SB calls, BB folds
Heads up, 2.5 big bets
Flop 8d-5h-2c
SB checks, hero bets, SB calls
Heads up, 3.5 big bets
Turn Ah
SB bets, hero calls all in (only $8 left behind)
SB shows A-K

2.)    Hero in cutoff with Jc-Jd
Two limpers, hero raises
Button folds, SB folds, BB calls, limpers call
Four players, 4  big bets
Flop 10c-8d-2d
Checks to hero who bets
BB calls, UTG +2 calls
Three players, 5.5 big bets
Turn 5h
Checks to hero who bets
Both villains call
Three players, 8.5 big bets
River  6d
Checks to hero who bets
Both villains call
BB shows 5d-6c
UTG +2 mucks

Hand number 2 I steamed over for some time.  In this hand I had an object for my distain.  The peel on the flop was absolutely terrible.  With no pair and no draw the pot wasn’t even close to being big enough for the miniscule odds for him to make a backdoor hand.  The call on the turn is equally horrible against two players with three overcards to his pair on board.  I may have been betting naked overcards but the other villain almost certainly called the flop with something and still had to act behind him!  Then, the crowning blunder is check-calling the river after making his hand.  I could have (probably should have) checked behind on the river, costing him $16 or he could have tried a check raise.

The bottom line is I steam for a while on these hands but then remind myself that it’s good that players make bad decisions in the long run; that is how decent players make money.  In the grand scheme, it’s good this player is sitting at my table, even if in the short run he caught some lucky cards and beat me.  Sure enough, by the end of the session this player had predictably bled off all his money and left the table broke.

My reaction to hand number 1 is a little more complicated.  In this hand there simply is no target for my anger. The bad guy in this hand is simply cold and impersonal probability.  It’s just a fact that when I raise a strong ace when it’s folded around to me in position, I’m going to run into a stronger ace in the blinds some percentage of the time.  No amount of my brilliant play or terrible play on the part of my opponents will change this.  There is no consolation like in hand number 2. 

When hands like number 1 happen (particularly when they repeatedly happen in the same session) my thoughts begin to wonder to superstition and impaired confidence.  These hands tweak my preexisting insecurities.  Like most people, I worry about my place in life, weather I work hard enough or deserve the benefits I enjoy.  I wonder sometimes if the success I’ve had in life is just some fluke and that eventually someone will find me out, discover I’m a fraud and things will tumble down.  Hands like number 1 make me doubt if my decision to play poker was flawed from the get go and trying to improve is simply flushing good money after bad.  I wonder if God or fate is trying to tell me that playing cards isn’t good for me and I need to quit.  After getting beaten up over and over in sessions like this, I leave worn out, exhausted and not looking forward to the next time I can play.

While my assessment is dismal, being able to articulate it helps a lot.  As soon as I can identify what’s happening and to speak (or write) about it clearly, the fuzzy thinking begins to dissipate.  What’s causing my frustration has nothing to do with the cards on the table, they simply are.  My tilt is caused by my flawed thinking about myself and my card playing.  To the extent that I can call out what’s going on I can change the channel, start focusing on the things I can have influence on and refine my decisions.

Miss the Flop?

Hand 1

Hero in BB with Ad-Qd
Three limpers, hero raises
Everyone calls
Four players, 4 big bets
Flop 5h-7s-8s
Hero bets
UTG +2 calls, button calls
Three players, 6.5  big bets
Turn 9s
Hero checks, UTG +2 bets
Button folds, hero folds.

Hand 2

Hero in cutoff with Ac-Jd
Two limpers, hero raises
BB calls, limpers call
Four players, 4 big bets
Flop Kd-8s-5s
Checks to hero who bets
BB calls, lowjack calls
Three players, 6.5 big bets
Turn Qh
Checks to hero who bets
BB calls
Heads up, 8.5 big bets
River 2s
BB checks, hero checks
BB shows 6d-5c, hero mucks

Hand 3

(Kill is on, stakes at 8/16) Hero on the button with QQ
Three limpers, hero raises
UTG +1 (on the kill) calls, everyone else calls
Four players, 4  big bets
Flop K-K-K
Check to hero who bets
UTG +1 calls, everyone else folds
Heads up, 5 big bets
Turn 5d
Villain checks
Hero bets, villain calls
Heads up, 7 big bets
River 7h
Villain checks
Hero bets, villain calls
Hero shows full house, villain mucks

These hands are all from the same session, a live 4/8 fixed limit game at a local card room.  The progression of these hands shows the trouble my opponents have with my strategy of pressing thin equity but tempered with good board texture reading.  The c-bet on hand 1 was probably a little too loose, I'm out of position and the board is too coordinated.  The prospects of my hand winning unimproved are too slim and I have too little fold equity to justify putting any more money in the pot, especially with a field of three players to get through.  Still, I felt it was worth a one-time shot and when a bad card comes on the turn, it's time to give up.

Hand 2 is frustrating.  I've got position this time and I'm bitching to myself about why I can't hit one cotton pickin' flop!  I can represent the K and there is loose coordination around the 8-5 with two to a suit so the calls don't bother me.  There's a good chance my A is even ahead.  The Q is a good card for me to barrel at and gives me a draw to the nuts.  The call tells me I'm against one of the legion of opponents I face who will never fold any pair.  My A has showdown value and villain is not calling with anything that doesn't beat me when the brick comes on the river.  So, no sense in firing a third barrel.

Hand 3 is that classic problem of flopping a monster, and now how do I get paid?  So many of my opponents will check this flop either trying to be tricky or too timid, worried about the case K.  However, my play prior to this hand has set up getting paid off perfectly.  There is no way I'm going to be given credit for the K (rightly so) when it's clear my preflop raising range is much bigger than A-K+.  My opponent knows I'm perfectly capable of betting down A high because he's seen me do it.  In his mind he has to call down with any pair or even A high hoping to at least chop.

It seems maddening missing flop after flop but if I can keep my cool and think about the game on a larger level, I can still profit.  Only part of the value of c-betting and barreling comes from fold equity and drawing out in a specific hand.  The only way I can get my big hands paid off is when I can capitalize on my opponents mistaken notion that I'm a maniac.  If I can make good board texture specific decisions my opponents will find ways to screw up against me.

Heaters

I’m sure you’ve seen them, I sure have.  The most remarkable I’ve witness was on my last trip to Las Vegas.  I was at the Orleans and a roly-poly, bespectacled older fellow sat across from me.  I could tell right away he was annoying because his wife grabbed a chair and sat behind him (Don’t you hate that?  Guys with girlfriends and wives with so little life of their own that they are willing to sit for hours and do nothing while their guy plays cards?).  Every few minutes this guy would lean backward into his wife who would snuggle him and pop some sort of treat in his mouth which he would chop wildly with his mouth wide open.  Seriously!  Like he was some sort of pit bull!  He had a thick accent (probably Mediterranean or a Spaniard) and was clearly known at the table, a regular.  Like most regulars that play low fixed limit, he was playing nearly every hand and his betting lines were passive and entirely conventional.  But, for some reason today, the poker gods where smiling on him.  What seemed like every hand this guy was showing up with monsters, full houses, flushes and quads at least twice.  Rack after rack our little super snacker was sending his wife to the cage for a color up.  He could not lose!  All’s the rest of us could do was look on with unconcealed disgust and envy as he would turn hands like 6-3 into an 18 big bet winning full house.

The remarkable thing about heaters is not so much the player that catches cards and makes strong hands.  All players do that from time to time.  The thing that makes them so extraordinary is making strong hands at PRECISELY the moment when one or two opponents make their strong (but second or third best) hand as well.  It’s rare to get pocket K’s, it’s even more rare to flop a set with them.  It’s astronomically rare to make a set of kings at precisely the moment when an opponent makes two pair or an under set.  Isn’t it almost always the case when you flop strong, bet and everyone either folds or you get only one caller who folds on the next street?

I have had lots of stints of running good.  I catch my normal frequency of starting hands (20-30%), about a third of those I connect with the board and about half to two thirds of those I end up winning the pot.  Only about one or two hands in a five hour session when I’m running good do I make big hands that get paid off.  My good sessions happen about one in eight or ten.   I do well in these sessions, usually doubling and sometimes tripling up my original buyin.  In my biggest session I quadrupled my buy in.  Much more common are grinding sessions when I get up one buyin and then get coolered once or twice and bleed back to a half buyin, then grind back up and bust back down again, always pivoting around that one or two buyin mark.

I have never had a monster, “can’t lose” session where I needed a wheelbarrow to get the chips to the cage and it’s got me wondering why.  Not that I’m whining and seething with injustice about why I never got my big heater.  I’m curious about the factors that influence the occurrence of these sessions and I’m pretty sure tight hand selection is one of the factors.

The hallmark of “running like God” is taking normally garbage starting hands and making monsters.  However, if I’m playing correct poker, even when I’m “running good” I still don’t play hands like 9-5 off suit.  So, those one or two sessions when I walked away with 4 buyins I was still only playing maybe 30% of my starting hand range.  This is contrary to nearly all my opponents who convince themselves they are in the middle of a supernatural event when the run good and start playing normally losing starting hands.  One time in 400 they may “get it right” and have a legendary session.  They imagine that “you never know” when one of these streaks may hit so whenever they win a few pots they talk themselves into thinking a heater is starting.  Having a monster session and witnessing other players having one only reinforces this squishy thinking.  The trouble is 399 times they will get it wrong and predictably lose their meager winnings right back.  In fact, those 399 times they lose so much they never get out of that hole.  Even the monster muncher guy and his little zoo keeper wife and their huge winnings that session I witnessed will make up only a few percentage points of all the losses that came before.  His fate was sealed not when the poker god’s smiled but when he decided 10-4 off suit was a hand he could win with.

By playing half or less of my starting hands compared to my opponents I may be curtailing the size of any monster sessions I may have (or more correctly moving the frequency from 1 in 300 to one in a thousand) but I’m also protecting the winnings I make FAR more frequently.  In sessions when I grind out a half a buyin, if my opponents played the exact same session, would have lost 2 buyins.

Honestly, it is tough to fold hand after hand only to watch a whale of player stacking mountains of chips making quads with 7-2.  The only consolation is the advertising value of such sessions.  My opponents see these heaters and are encouraged that they will be the next recipients of the smiling poker god’s manna and keep right on playing their horrible strategy.

It's a Mistake!

The casino was new to me.  I hadn’t played there before or even noticed it on the few drives I’ve been by on the freeway.  It’s pretty much the same sort of dumpy surroundings most of the card clubs in my area.  Our indian casinos are a step up but going to the same haunts over and over is tedious and the stakes and game offerings aren’t always optimal.  What I was interested in with this new establishment was the possibility of a soft fixed limit game in stakes that are a little higher than what I normally play, specifically $8/16.

There is an 8/16 game at a card room much closer to where I live but the action there is very erratic.  The normal 4/8 games I play in (and consistently beat) the action is very homogenous.  Almost all my opponents in those games are loose-passive.  They play way too many hands, they check and call instead of bet and raise and are just content to sit back and try to make hands.  These players have a faint understanding of hand reading but absolutely do not have any thinking by way of equity when they play.  They call down in spots with very small pot odds for the amount of equity they have and they fail to press in situations when they have odds and decent equity.  Generally, these games are very profitable to play in because opponents are so predictable.  The occasional aggressive player that sits down (even fairly decent ones) are seldom a problem either because all the loose-passive regulars pay off so well over and over.

The 8/16 game at my local card room is often not like this.  Often there are several aggressive players in these games, which has two results.  The first is that the aggressive action builds big pots so variance goes up.  Winning sessions are big but so are losing sessions and loses can mushroom FAST.  At 8/16 you can drop $600 within a half an hour easily.  The second issue is hand reading.  Aggressive players are much less predictable.  Typically, bad players stay bad but as they move up in stakes they become more aggressive.  In my games this means 8/16 player still play a very weak hand selection range.  These folks have learned enough to know that aggressive play is correct play but never got the memo that tight hand selection is a prerequisite.

The result is a game that feels like a knife fight on a tightrope.  A lot of pressure is put on your post flop game to read board texture and assign hand ranges to opponents.  Failing to do this can result in loosing big pots but more importantly will result in missed value.  The few extra bets you pick up in these game matter, A LOT.  Because loses can mount so quickly in these games, you need to pick up extra bets here and there to survive.

As I sat down to an 8/16 game at this new casino the terrible hand selection became apparent quickly.  Hands as bad as 5-7 off suit where common.  I was also reassured to see passive play, lots of open limping, lots of multiway pots.  My troubles started with a lot of stuff I had little control over.  Spots where I raised preflop, hit top pair but caught terrible on the turn and/or river.  I’m getting better at recognizing variance and not letting it get to me.  However, there were several spots I could have lost a lot less.  Missing the flop and c-betting into four and five players (often out of position) with two high cards on board and often betting the turn, too unimproved.  But, the biggest mistake I made highlights the issue above.

A grumpy and aggressive player raised preflop in middle position.  There were several callers and I woke up with pocket 10’s in the small blind.  I three bet and grumpy called along with four other calling stations.  The flop came A-K-Q rainbow and I bet.  One caller and grumpy raised.  One caller in between and it was one small bet back to me.  I had odds to draw to my set or straight so I called.  A J came on the turn giving me the nuts and so I bet out again.  Grumpy raised again and it came to heads up with one big bet back to me.  The worst that can happen in this hand at this point is a chop.  I have nothing to lose by raise and capping.  The board could pair on the river and I could lose to a full house but that isn’t likely.  So, what did I do?  Like a little mouse I called…  And, ever worse, when a brick 3 came on the river I CHECKED!  Grumpy checked behind, I showed my straight and he mucked disgustingly.

As bad as I played this hand it did start a nice little run of cards for me and I made it in to positive territory for the session.  But, (as often happens) I bled off a lot and finally two or three bad beats hit and I was felted.  I sure could have used that extra roughly $32 I missed on the above hand to try and play the extra hour or so that I had for the day.  Doing so would have given me a chance to salvage the session.  But, because I had failed to think my way through that earlier hand I had reached my stop loss and had to leave.

I’m not exactly sure what was going on in my head with my passive play with grumpy.  Maybe it was the new surroundings or how cold it was in that room (I was wearing my winter coat!).  Mostly, I guess I had a little confidence crisis.  I don’t have a good record with trying to move up in stakes.  My poor perforce is also mixed with the gradual realization that trying to grind at 4/8 is a real slog.  Showing only $5 or $6 an hour for my time isn’t what I would call productive.  This jibes with what I’ve read from fixed limit pros that because of the rake, you need to move up in stakes as quickly as you can.  I also have recently made plans to go to Las Vegas during the World Series and would really like a nice run to boost my bankroll before I go.  Feeling the pressure of these things caused me to freeze up perhaps.

While it’s no fun making mistakes (especially ones I know I shouldn’t be making) they are a part of playing the game.  By putting so much pressure on myself to not make mistakes I’m basically assuring the fact that I’ll make them and that they are more costly than they should be.  If I can relax some of my expectations and just focus on one hand at a time I can do myself a favor.

Annoying the Regulars

Hero in cutoff with Ad-6d
Two limpers, hero calls
Button calls, small blind completes, big blind checks
Six players, 3 big bets
Flop Kd-8s-9d
One limper bets, hero raises
Button folds, sb folds
Big blind calls, limper calls
Three players, 9 big bets
Turn 2c
Checks to hero who bets

One of the regulars I play a lot with was complaining about players who raise in position on the flop going for a free card play.  He thought it was a terrible play and wastes a lot of money.  His thinking was that betting on the come is a losing play because draws so seldom hit.  Furthermore, so many players try the free card play it’s almost a given if there are two cards to a suit on the flop.  He thinks the play is annoying and transparent.  I told him I agree with him, that a free card play is annoying and transparent.  I also told him that’s why I keep coming on the turn when I DO bet on the come.  I told him it’s true that draws brick out more often than not but that only means that I need to maximize my equity when they do.  Especially if a pot is multi way, I’m going to raise and cap on the flop.  I do this to because I have an equity edge if it’s three ways or more (36%) and because I have to make up for all those times I missed my draws.

The transparency problem is the reason I keep coming on the turn.  I expose my hand with a check the turn after raising on the flop.  Now, my opponents will bet almost any non-flush card on the river fairly certain I’ll fold.  Also, when I go bet-bet after the flop I preserve fold equity.  Let’s say the Qc comes on the turn instead of the deuce.  I bet and get called in one spot.  A J comes on the river, what’s my opponent going to think of his 7-8 given my raise on the flop.  Getting 12:1 on my bluff the number of times he has to fold is microscopic (compared to the size of the pot) to make this line profitable.

My regular friend just shook his head.  He has played cards for many years and is just convinced he has nothing new to learn.  The truth is he enjoys a very passive, low variance style of play where he shows positive EV but is pretty much a waste of time given the number of hours he logs.  However, the comp points and the freeroll tournament he qualifies for every month are more than enough (in his mind) to make up.  The only fly in the ointment is when a player like me sits down and starts charging him an extra small bet for every flop he wants to see.  I guess I’d be pretty annoyed too.

What's the Worst that Could Happen?

In my most recent coaching session with Ed I asked him about what to focus on while I’m in a hand.  Obviously, the most important element would be putting opponents on a range of hands, but what about board texture?  To be the good, proactive poker player I want to be I want to anticipate what cards might come and how they might affect my opponent’s holdings.

Ed told me about a hypothetical in that holding bottom two pair on a flop like 5-2-K with a bet and a call while discussing a hand in a coaching session.  He asks the player, “OK, what are you thinking here about the possible holdings of your opponent.”  He said that invariably players will answer something like, “Well, he could have pocket K’s for top set and beat me.”  Ed says it’s not helpful to think like that.  The likelihood of an opponent holding exactly that hand is so remote that it doesn’t deserve the energy needed to make the thought.

A much more helpful thought process is to focus on the swing hands.  If an opponent holds a monster hand like top set, it really doesn’t matter what I do.  Any decision I make will likely not affect the outcome of the hand, getting beat.  Likewise, it’s not helpful to think much about hands I’m beating on a flop like this because who is going to call me?  But, what about all the other potential holdings of my opponent; those hands that could be influenced one way or another by the decisions I make (bet, call, raise).  In our example, the most helpful line of thinking is to imagine hands that could draw out on me, not because I should fear these hands and back off on my aggression, but because those are the hands that are going to pay me off.  Those are my target hands.

For hands to have value Ed says they have to meet two criteria.  One, is that you have to get money in the pot.  The value of aggression is that it gives you another way to win but it also builds pots for you to profit.  The other criteria is that you have to get to show down.  Unless you get to show down the only value a hand has is folding equity.  In fixed limit this is seldom much of a problem because players so rarely fold hands on the turn (but they often do on the river when draws don’t pan out).  This last point highlights something important; when I have a value hand in order to realize that value I have to allow for the possibility that my opponent will draw out.

This was a big change in my thinking.  In the past our example hand would often cause me to put on the brakes on the turn.  I would bet out or raise in position on the flop and get three callers and think I was up against a better two pair or set.  The truth is that on boards like 5-2-K I am going to get calls, not because opponents are beating me but because loosely connected boards with a single high card connect with LOTS of hands.  Gutshots around the 5-2, small pairs (5’s, 2’s) that will peel on the flop to see if they can improve are all absolutely along for the ride on a hand like this.  Another really common thing players do at these low stakes is play any king.

What do all these hands (gut shots, small pairs, weak K’s) have in common?  Well, they can all draw out on bottom two pair.  BUT, they are also the hands that will pay you off.  Risk vs. reward is the name of the game in poker.  So much of the majority of the time the board will roll out on the turn with something like Q, 7 or 10, 8 cards that have nothing to do with hands that are calling you.  But, if a 3 comes out or another K and someone whips out a check-raise, only then might you consider taking your foot off the gas.

Thinking about those swing hands and what the turn and river might do to them is the most profitably way to think when playing hands for value.

Promotions and Bad Play

One of the things I see a lot in my local card rooms are players who change their strategy in hopes of winning a promotional jackpot.  Many card rooms have a jackpot drop in addition to the rake.  One or two dollars is taken from every pot and put into a pool of money.  Card room management then comes up with contests to award this money to players.  One of the most common contests is a so called “Bad Beat.”  A particular strong hand (such as Aces full of Jacks) is named by the card room management and if that hand is beat a chunk of that jackpot pool is awarded.  Typically, with the Bad Beat, half is given to the looser of the hand, a quarter to the winner and the remaining is shared with the other players at the table.

A more common promotion is the “high hand” (or “Monte Carlo” in my area).  Big hands like four-of-a-kind (“quads”) or straight flushes are awarded bonuses from the jackpot pool above what they win from the pot.  Usually, there are rules associated with these bonuses.  A minimum number players must be in a hand, a minimum dollar amount must be in the pot (enough for the jackpot drop to be raked from the pot) and both hole cards must be used to make the player’s hand.

There are good and bad points to this bonus system.  The primary reason any card room uses them is to draw players in.  This is an obvious benefit.  The more players in a room the more action, the more action the more possibility of profit.  Another benefit is the potential for remediation of the rake.  As I’ve discussed earlier, at low stakes the rake a room takes represents a large percentage of the overall take for a winning player.  Winning a promotional jackpot once every six weeks or so can go a long way to recouping some of that lost money.

A significant drawback to promotions has to do with philosophy and influence over players decisions.  Philosophically, many advanced players object to promotions because they believe it arbitrarily rewards players based on chance, not on correct play.  They resent being made to pay a dollar or two out of every pot they win and given to other players who are simply lucky enough to be dealt a big hand.  Poker is expensive enough, they argue, having to play blinds and room rake.  The redistribution argument aside, the math may be on their side.  The cumulative amount a player pays in jackpot drop may be more (in the long run) than the potential winnings from a promotion depending on how a particular card room structures their bonus system.

A bigger issue, in my opinion, has to do with the influence promotions have on poker decissions players make.  An example is when players in the blinds collude to try and hit a jackpot.  Often, as a courtesy, the two players in the blinds will take back (i.e. “chop”) their blinds and fold their hands preflop if action is folded around to them.  The courtesy is extended to the table to get a hand over with that seldom has much potential for profit and get on with the game.  Most of the players I play with employ this “chop” courtesy.  Some don’t and want to play blind vs. blind.  In my opinion, either is fine so long as a player is consistent and understands their options.  Where promotions complicate this is when a player in the blind has suited connectors or a pocket pair and wants to try for a jackpot.  Often this confusing exception is employed and players will check down the hand in a hopeless attempt.  Not only is this technically a rule violation and even if the player hits a jackpot should not be awarded the money, but it’s a waste of time.  If two or three of these situations arise in a game an hour that could potentially be one less hand.  Six hands a session over the course of a year adds up fast and potentially robs players of opportunity.

Another situation I’ve commonly seen is when players slow play trying to hit a promotion.  Say for example a player has a pocket pair and makes a set on the flop.  A poker room has a promotion paying $50 for quads.  So many times I’ve seen players check and call with these hands hoping for their case card and win the jackpot.  They fear if they play aggressively that opponents will fold and they won’t see the turn or river and miss out on their chance.  These players fail to take into consideration the equity they are sacrificing and the potential reward.  The case card for a set on the flop to make quads by the river will come 1 time in 25.  The 24 other times a player misses his quads around 36 big bets in total are missed by slow playing.  Since a set does get beat around 20% of the time we can discount this amount to about 30 big bets.  So, even at the small 3/6 stakes fixed limit games I play in that’s $180 in missed profit, ALL FOR A $50 JACKPOT!

An often missed aspect of this issue is the impact on the action at the table.  An example would be if I had an open ended straight draw in the above example with my opponent making a set on the flop.  The other player in the hand has a gut shot draw to a higher straight.  So, unbeknownst to me four of my outs are “dirty” and would make my hand but also the third opponent’s better hand.  I would bet and/or raise this hand on the flop but the opponent with the set (hoping to hit his quads and $50 promotion) is just calling.  Had the set owner raised or re-raised correctly (given the strength of his hand) the gut shot opponent would not have been given odds to chase his draw and folded or mistakenly put the money in anyway.  Now my “dirty” straight card comes and the set holder not only loses his hand but I get beat too.  Or, my “clean” out card hits and I get less money than I should have because the gut shot opponent wasn’t given the opportunity to make his mistake.

The bottom line is that promotions (love ‘em or hate ‘em) are a big part of most card rooms.  Players are well advised to be aware of them, learn the rules that govern them and understand how they can impact play at the tables.

Smallish Pocket Pairs

Pocket pairs from 5’s to 8’s I have often played in set mining mode.  I’ve called one or even two raises hoping to hit my set on the flop and scoop a big pot.  I’ve been willing to forego a small bit of equity (folding or just plain value) for the benefit of a usually small initial investment.  Occasionally, these hands will hit big such as a flop like K-Q-6 while I’m holding pocket 6’s with a preflop raiser.  Even better is when I fill up with a flush or straight on board.  But, I’ve reconsidered this strategy recently and elected to take a more aggressive line that increases my short term variance but will net me more money in the long run.

The important element in my analysis has to do with how often those big hands come around when I not only hit my set (one time in eight) but the board also hits my opponents strongly enough to get paid off big.  Considering every flop will miss any random hand 2 out of three times, the math doesn’t look hopeful.  In fact, those two factors happening together doesn’t make up for the initial investment of limping and calling with these hands.  So, where can I make up the difference?  I think the answer is in thin value and folding equity.

About as often as I make my set AND the board hits my opponent a hand like pocket 6’s may win unimproved or (if played aggressively) may get a better hand to fold.  Example 1.) I raise in cutoff with 6-6 and only the big blind calls holding 6-7.  I the flop comes 7-J-2.  It checks to me and I bet.  The turn is a K, I bet and BB thinks about it and calls.  The river is an A, checks to me and I bet.  There are 5 big bets in the pot, so my opponent has to fold only 1 time in 6 to make this play profitable. Chances are he’s not going to think much of his 7’s.  This is fold equity that I have been missing by not playing my hands aggressively.

Example 2.) Say I have 5-5 and raise on the button.  The flop comes Q-9-7.  The big blind and cutoff called my preflop raise and both check to me on the flop.  I bet and both call.  The turn is a 2.  It checks to me and I bet, both call again.  On a board like this what could be calling me.  Well, possibly a Q or 9 but what about all the other hands.  There are so many straight draws with a flop like this, hands like J-10 and 8, 8-6 and 5, K-J, 5-6, 10-8 so many that will call all the way to the river and just end up folding when they brick out.  The same for two and three cards to a suit.  Much the same as the previous bluffing hand, these drawing hands will spike a pair, call the river and win.  They also will sometimes make their draw.  But given the odds with two callers, they only have to brick out and fold 1 time in 8 for this line to be profitable.

Example 3.) is when a pocket pair wins unimproved.  I have 7-7 in middle position and raise.  I’m called by the button and big blind.  The flop comes 6-3-J.  BB checks to me, I bet and am called by button and BB.  Turn is a 5.  Not a great card for me but it checks to me again and I bet and called in both spots again.  The river is a Q.  That card scares me a bit so I check behind when it’s check to me planning to make a crying call when button bets.  To my surprise he checks as well and shows 6-7 suited.  Big blind mucks and I scoop the pot. 

In the last example had I played in set mining mode I would have missed my set on the flop, checked and almost certainly the button would have bet, thinking his 6’s were good.  I would have been left thinking that I was only drawing to 2 outs with a tiny pot and would have (correctly) folded.  In example 2 a hand like this might check down and I could win but only a tiny pot and I would be vulnerable to a bluff by one of the broken draws.  In example 1 it’s very clear that I am not winning without an aggressive line.

Adding in all this missing equity along with the times I do hit my set make playing smaller pocket pairs aggressively a winning play.  On any one individual hand I may lose more then if I would have taken a more passive line but the rewards long term are greater.  Essentially, I’m risking 1 to win about 1.5 when I take an aggressive line and about breaking even with the passive set mining approach.  Accounting for the rake, when you break even in this game, you are losing money.

Clear Headed Evaluation

A hand I played recently went like this:

Hero in cutoff with K-10o

Folds to hero who raises

Called by sb.

Heads up, 2.5 big bets

Flop is 10d-5d-8s

Check to hero who bets

Sb makes a snide comment and calls

Heads up, 3.5 big bets

Turn Qd

Check to her who bets

Sb calls

Heads up, 5.5 big bets

River 2c

Check to hero who bets

Sb folds

The fellow in the small blind I hadn’t played with before but had been watching him closely for a couple hours before this hand.  He had a fairly big stack in front of him and was playing very aggressively.  He was playing a great many hands, probably closed to 70% and the cards I saw him show down with were pretty weak starting hands, things like A-rag and off suit one gap connectors.  It was clear to me that he was losing more showdowns than winning but was far more than making up for those losses with fold equity.  Player after player were folding to his aggression on the turn and river.  I was in good position to exploit this type of play, two players to his left.  When I started catching a few hands to play and he was open raising I began three betting, knowing I was likely ahead of him and also making it difficult for those behind me to call three cold in order to play.  Upon connecting with the flop I took several big pot from him.  I also showed down a few hands against other players, losing on the river with my busted draw hoping to get a fold.  Seeing these hands, this fellow assumed I played like him not realizing that my hand selection was really much tighter than he imagined and much more sensitive to position.  On the flop of the above hand, this guy blurted out loud, “I just don’t know what you have?  I’m gonna call.  You are one of those weird players that comes in here.” 

The session I played this hand in was one of my biggest.  I finished with five times my original my buyin.  But, the satisfaction from that win was not nearly as good as the glee I felt from this fellow’s comment.  He is a decent player, aggressive and observant.  Many times I’ve played against his ilk and felt intimated, like I was being targeted and made mistakes in my anxiety.  This time, however, I was able to calmly analysis what this fellow was up to.  I realized the logic of what he was doing and made adjustments to my strategy to exploit the weakness in his game, namely just playing too many hands.  He, on the other hand, was not able to figure out my play.  He failed to make adjustments to his strategy and consequently just kept losing to me.  I imagine his comment was an attempt to needle me.  As if to say, “you don’t play like I expect you to so you must be a poor player.”  But, the effect was the opposite.  I was proud and thrilled to be so confusing this guy.  I was pleased he could not or would not adjust to the game I was playing and profited from it.  It was an important step forward for me as I continue to try and derive some meaning from the habits of my opponents and avoiding my own insecurities and confidence issues that can blind me.